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Abstract—Blockchain technology provides an auditable and
tamper-proof distributed storage infrastructure for information
records. This can be leveraged to support distributed workflow
management. Compared to proof-of-work consensus, popularized
by Bitcoin and Ethereum, blockchains based on BFT (byzantine
fault tolerance) ordering consensus trade scalability for immedi-
acy and finality of consensus. This makes them easier to use as
distribution infrastructure, as applications need not be adapted to
deal with eventual consistency and delayed consensus of proof-of-
work blockchains. Hence, applications such as workflow engines
can be easily ported to such a blockchain infrastructure to
take advantage of their decentralized integrity assurance and
information distribution model. In this paper we describe how the
YAWL workflow engine can be used on a BFT based blockchain
infrastructure to enable collaborative workflows across different
organizations.
Index Terms—Workflow management, distributed workflow,
inter-organizational workflow, YAWL, Blockchain, Byzantine
Fault Tolerance
I. INTRODUCTION
Inter-organizational business processes may include partic-
ipants in adversarial relationships that have to jointly execute
business processes. Trust in the state of a process instance and
in the correct execution of activities by other stakeholders may
be lacking. Blockchain technology can provide a trusted, dis-
tributed workflow execution infrastructure for such situations.
A blockchain cryptographically signs a series of blocks,
containing transactions, so that it is difficult or impossible to
alter earlier blocks in the chain without this being detectable.
In a distributed blockchain, actors independently order and
validate transactions, add them to the blockchain, and replicate
the chain across nodes. Actors must reach agreement regarding
the order and validity of transactions and blocks. In workflow
execution, it is important that actors agree on the ”state of
work” as this determines the set of next valid activities in the
process. Hence, it is natural to use blockchain transactions to
describe the state of work.
Blockchain technology admits different system designs, and
workflow management systems (WfMS) can be implemented
in different ways on different types of blockchains. In this
paper we present a novel architecture for blockchain-based
workflow management. Our contributions are twofold:
First, in contrast to prior work, which has focused on proof-
of-work blockchains, we show that a blockchain based on a
Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) ordering consensus protocol
can be used as workflow execution infrastructure.
Second, in contrast to earlier work, we port an existing,
full-featured workflow engine to a blockchain-based workflow
management system (WfMS) without smart contracts. The
particular workflow system we focus on here is the YAWL
system [1], chosen because of its open source implementation
and its complete coverage of workflow patterns.
Our approach is independent of any particular workflow
language and workflow language semantics as we do not
implement a BPMN or workflow net model processor but
instead focus on events in work item lifecycles. This language
independence allows an easy extension to other workflow
engines, as long they support similar work item lifecycles.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion II reviews related work on blockchain-based WfMS. We
then describe the principles of distributed blockchains with
a focus on BFT-based consensus (Sec. III). Section IV de-
scribes the architecture of our system. Section V presents our
adaptation of the YAWL system1. The final Sec. VI discusses
corectness guarantees of our architecture, its limitations, and
future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Recent literature presents a number of workflow execution
prototypes implementations, all of them using smart contracts.
A smart contract is software code that is stored on the
blockchain and execuated as part of blockchain transaction
processing. In this way, a smart contract ensures code integrity
and consensus on execution results. Many blockchains provide
a language and virtual machine for smart contract execution,
such as the Solidity language and associated virtual machine
originally developed for the Ethereum blockchain.
In a project driven by a financial institution, a domain-
specific workflow implementation using Ethereum and smart
contracts supports the digital document flow in the im-
port/export trading domain [2], [3]. The project demonstrates
lowered execution cost, and claims increased transparency
and trust among trading partners. Another domain-specific
blockchain-based workflow project in the real-estate domain
also uses Ethereum and smart contracts [4]. The authors claim
1Source code is available from https://joerg.evermann.ca/software.html
ar
X
iv
:2
00
6.
05
80
8v
1 
 [c
s.D
C]
  1
0 J
un
 20
20
the lack of a central agency will make it difficult for regulators
to enforce obligations and responsibilities of trading partners.
A domain-agnostic blockchain-based workflow execution
system [5], [6] uses Ethereum smart contracts as choreography
monitors, where they monitors execution status and validity of
workflow messages, or as active mediators, where they ”drive”
the process by sending and receiving messages2 according
to a process model. BPMN models are translated into smart
contracts. Nodes monitor the blockchain for messages from the
smart contract and create transactions for the smart contract.
The cost for executing smart contracts and the execution
latency are recognized as limitations. A comparison between
the public Ethereum blockchain and the Amazon Simple
Workflow Service shows blockchain-based execution costs to
be two orders of magnitude higher [7], [8]. Hence, optimizing
the space and computational requirements for smart contracts
is important [9]. BPMN models are first translated to Petri Nets
[10], to which existing minimizing algorithms are applied. The
minimized Petri nets are then compiled into smart contracts,
achieving up to 25% reduction in execution costs [5], [6],
while also improving throughput time. Building on lessons
learned from [5], [6], Caterpillar is an open-source blockchain-
based workflow management system [11]. Developed using the
Node.js JavaScript runtime it uses the Solidity compiler solc
and the Ethereum client geth to provide a distributed execution
environment for BPMN-based process models. The Caterpillar
system has been extended to directly interpret BPMN models,
i.e. it provides a workflow engine as a set of smart contracts.
Lorikeet [12] is similar to the original Caterpillar system, also
based on BPMN models that are translated to smart contracts.
While most implementations use a flow-based workflow
specification, declarative workflows can also be deployed
on a blockchain infrastructure [14]. This approach is also
implemented on Ethereum using Solidity smart contracts.
In summary, while existing work varies in terms of features
and capabilities, all existing blockchain-based workflow exe-
cution systems are based on proof-of-work blockchains and all
use smart contracts. More specifically, all are based on the
Ethereum blockchain and its smart contract virtual machine.
Moreover, all (re-)implement a workflow engine, for example
for BPMN, in smart contracts. In contrast, our work is based
neither on proof-of-work chains, nor on smart contracts, nor
do we need to implement or re-implement a workflow engine.
III. BLOCKCHAINS
A blockchain records transactions in consecutive blocks. A
transaction can be any kind of content. Integrity is maintained
by hashing the content of each block, which also contains the
hash of the previous block. Hence, altering a block requires
changing all following blocks. In a typical distributed block-
chain, blocks are replicated across nodes. New transactions
may originate on any node and must be recorded in new
2An Ethereum transaction is a message that is signed by an externally-
owned account using its public key. Smart contracts can call other contracts
by sending messages but as they do not have a public/private key pair for
signing messages, those messages are not considered transactions.
blocks. The key challenge is to achieve consensus on the
validity and order of transactions and blocks, despite nodes
that are characterized by ”byzantine faults”: they may not
respond correctly, may respond unpredictably, or may become
altogether unresponsive.
A. Proof-of-Work Consensus
Bitcoin popularized proof-of-work for consensus finding
and securing the blockchain. New transactions are distributed
to all nodes, independently validated, and added to a node’s
transaction pool. A node can independently propose new
blocks from transactions in its pool, based on its latest block
and its hash, and distribute the new blocks to other nodes.
Depending on network speeds and topology, nodes may have
different sets of blocks and transactions, and hence may pro-
pose different blocks, leading to side branches. Node considers
the longest branch as their current main branch and propose
new blocks based on it. Transactions in side branches are not
considered valid. When a side branch becomes longer than
the current main branch, the chain undergoes a reorganization:
What was the side branch is validated and becomes the main
branch. What was the main branch is considered invalid and
becomes a side branch. Transactions no longer in the main
branch are added back to the transaction pool to be included
in future blocks. Hence, different nodes may consider different
blocks and transactions as valid. As proposed blocks are
distributed across the network, nodes will eventually reach a
consensus regarding valid blocks and transactions, and their
order in the main branch of the chain.
To limit the rate of new block proposals and to secure
the blockchain against attacks, block proposers must solve a
hard problem (”proof-of-work”, ”mining”). Typically, this is to
require the block hash to be less than a certain value. A limited
block rate allows nodes to achieve eventual consensus, and a
hard problem prevents attackers from ”overtaking” the creation
of legitimate blocks with fraudulent one. Hence, a successful
attack requires control of > 50% of the total hashing power
of all nodes.
The probability for a transaction in the main branch to
become invalid due to a chain reorganization decreases with
each block that is mined on top of it, but in principle it
is always possible for a transaction to become invalid. In
addition to this lack of finality of consensus, this approach
induces significant latency as applications must wait not only
for one block but many to be created. Applications that use the
blockchain infrastructure must actively monitor the status of
all transactions of interest, must react to chain reorganizations,
and communicate this information to the user.
B. BFT-Based Consensus and State Machine Replication
In response to the drawbacks of the proof-of-work consen-
sus provably correct ordering algorithms based on distributed
systems research have seen a resurgence in interest. Most of
the ongoing research can be traced back to a practical method
for achieving byzantine fault tolerance (PBFT) [15] where
tolerating up to f faulty nodes requires 3f + 1 total nodes.
PBFT achieves consensus on the order of requests using a set
of fully-connected ordering nodes.
Protocol: Every ordering consensus is established by a
specific set of nodes (”view”), with a leader or primary node.
A client sends a request to all nodes. The leader proposes
a sequence number for the request and broadcasts this in a
pre-prepare message. Upon receipt of a pre-prepare message,
a node broadcasts a corresponding prepare message if it
has itself received the request, and has not already received
another pre-prepare message for the same sequence number.
This indicates the node is prepared to accept the proposed
sequence number. Nodes wait to receive 2f matching prepare
messages, indicating that 2f +1 nodes are prepared to accept
the proposed sequence number for the request. When a node
has received 2f identical prepare messages, it broadcasts a
commit message to all nodes. Nodes then waits to receive 2f
identical commit messages, indicating that 2f +1 nodes have
accepted the proposed sequence number for the request. Upon
committing, the node executes the request and sends a reply
message to the client. The client waits for 2f + 1 identical
replies, which indicates that a consensus has been reached on
the sequence number of the request.
The leader is not a fixed, central, or privileged node and
is changed by consensus when nodes detect an unresponsive
or malfunctioning leader. Leader change uses a three-stage
protocol similar to the normal ordering protocol.
Consensus request sequencing is closely related to state
machine replication (SMR): Every node maintains a state that
can be changed by client requests. When every node begins
with the same state and executes requests in the same order,
the state machine is replicated.
Implementation: BFT-SMART [16] is a software library
built around a BFT protocol and adds dynamic view reconfig-
uration (nodes can join and leave views) and state exchange.
BFT-SMART provides a simple programming interface. The
client-side interface allows submission of requests. Appli-
cations implement a server-side interface, encapsulating the
state machine, that receives ordered requests in consensus
sequence from the library for execution. Requests are simple
byte arrays and opaque to the library, the client- and server-
side applications must serialize and deserialize these in a
meaningful way. View reconfigurations (adding or removing
a node, or changing the level of fault tolerance) are special
types of requests but are treated as any other request for
ordering and consensus purposes. For state exchange, the
server-side application implements methods to fetch and set
state snapshots, also serialized as byte arrays. When a node
joins a view, it is sent the latest checkpointed state using
collaborative state transfer, and requests after the checkpoint
are then replayed, allowing the server state to catch up to the
consensus state.
BFT-SMART has been proven to be correct and live, i.e.
it will provide the same sequence of operations to all nodes
and will not deadlock [16]. In terms of throughput, a system
with four nodes (f = 1) has been shown to support more than
15,000 requests (1kB size) per second with latencies around 10
milliseconds on a local network. The performance decreases
linearly as fault tolerance (and hence the number of nodes)
increases: A system with 10 nodes (f = 3) has been shown
to support more than 10,000 requests per second [16].
Summary: BFT-based ordering avoids the latency, lack of
finality and computational demands of proof-of-work consen-
sus. On the other hand, its three-stage protocol imposes sig-
nificant communication overhead and requires fully-connected
nodes. Fault tolerance in BFT increases linearly with the
number of nodes, but performance decreases due to additional
communication. The different strengths and weaknesses of the
two consensus mechanisms suggest that BFT-based ordering
is a good fit with small, permissioned blockchains as they
are used in the inter-organizational collaborative workflow
management context. This is echoed by [17], who recommend
BFT-based consensus for workflow execution because ”it guar-
antees safety, liveness, and some degree of fault tolerance” and
proof-of-work is ”impractical since the confirmation settlement
is too long and unreliable”.
IV. GENERAL ARCHITECTURE
The main component of a workflow management system is
the workflow engine, which interprets the workflow specifica-
tion and enables work items for execution by external services
[18]. Prior work (Sec. II) has deployed the workflow engine on
the blockchain itself, by compiling BPMN workflow specifica-
tions to smart contracts or by implementing a BPMN intepreter
as a smart contract. In this paper, we treat the distributed
blockchain as an infrastructure layer for existing off-chain
workflow engines. We use the blockchain only for storing and
sharing the state of work and achieving consensus on that state.
To our knowledge, there has been no such implementation
using BFT-based or any other ordering mechanism.
Ordering service, block service, and the workflow engine
are the three main components in our system architecture. In
contrast to proof-of-work based blockchains, our architecture
requires no mining service, no transaction service to manage
pending transactions, and no virtual machine to execute or
validate smart contract operations.
Ordering Service: The ordering service in our prototype
uses the BFT-SMART library [16]. It consists of a client and
a server. The ordering service client receives requests from
clients and submits them to the ordering layer. Once ordered,
the ordering layer submits the requests in consensus sequence
to the ordering service server. The ordering layer maintains a
fully connected network between all ordering nodes. Messages
on this network are encrypted and signed using pre-distributed
public/private keys.
Block Service: The block service stores the blockchain,
may exchange blocks with other nodes, and verifies the in-
tegrity of the blockchain. The block service uses a peer-to-peer
network for block exchange with new and recovering nodes.
This network is distinct from the ordering layer network and is
not fully connected, but is encrypted and authenticated using
the same public/private keys. Verification of the blockchain
proceeds backwards from the block with the latest hash and
any missing blocks are requested from other peers and verified
prior to adding them to the local blockchain.
Workflow Engine: The workflow engine maintains in-
formation about work items, workflow instances (cases), and
workflow specifications. Together, this information forms the
”state of work” or ”workflow state”. We call any operation
that changes the workflow state a ”workflow operation”. The
workflow engine interacts with services that provide resource
management and worklists for user tasks, and with external
services for service tasks.
The ordering service uses the term ”request” to denote
the objects it is ordering, the block services uses the term
”transaction” to denote the objects it stores in blocks, and
the workflow engine uses the term ”workflow operation” to
denote the objects that change the workflow state. In our
architecture, these terms denote the same object: A workflow
operation is ordered as a request, stored as a transaction
on the blockchain, and executed by the workflow engine.
We define workflow operations using lifecycle models for
workflow specifications at runtime, workflow cases, and work
items. Any transition in such a lifecycle model, such as the
creation of a new specification or the completion of a work
item, is a workflow operation. The XES standard [19] defines
a work item lifecycle, as does the YAWL system [1].
In principle, a system architecture can encompass different
numbers of ordering services, block services, and workflow
engines, distributed in different combinations on different
network nodes. However, as the absence of trust among partic-
ipating actors is a key motivation for the use of blockchains,
we assume that every process participant requires and provides
its own workflow engine, block service, and ordering service.
We call this combination of workflow engine, block service,
and ordering service a ”node” in our architecture.
This assumption significantly simplifies the architecture and
implementation. Most importantly, new blocks can be created
and stored locally on each node from ordered requests. In
proof-of-work blockchains, new blocks are created by a single
node, the successful mining node, and then distributed to other
nodes. A more efficient alternative that is possible in our
architecture is for every ordering service server to create new
blocks from ordered requests and pass the new blocks directly
to the local block service for inclusion in the blockchain. As
the order of requests is identical for all nodes, the created
blocks will be identical. This removes the need for block
distribution, avoiding latencies and differences in block order.
In proof-of-work blockchains, blocks contain multiple trans-
actions and mining nodes maintain a pool of pending transac-
tion. The number of transactions in a block is a trade-off be-
tween desired transaction throughput, available hashing power,
desired block creation rate, available network bandwidth, and
tolerance for latency. In contrast, in BFT-based systems, there
is no expensive mining. Hence, there is no reason to delay
block creation and for blocks to contain multiple transactions:
The blockchain becomes a chain of transactions.
V. ADAPTING YAWL
The YAWL (”Yet Another Workflow Language”) workflow
management system [1] is an open source workflow system
for the YAWL language. The YAWL language is based on
workflow nets, with significant extensions, and was designed
to allow specification of workflow patterns [20]. The YAWL
system consists of a workflow engine, a resource service, a
workflow specification editor (modeling component), and a
set of other services. The YAWL engine maintains workflow
specifications for run-time, workflow case information and
work item information. The resource service maintains the
organizational model, work item allocations and provides
worklist management. The resource service also provides the
graphical user interfaces for user tasks. The specification
editor is a Java application. The engine and other services are
implemented as a set of web applications for a Java application
server (typically Apache Tomcat). These provide a number
of Java servlet APIs for communication between the engine
and different services. Communication is done with XML
documents; persistence is managed through a Hibernate layer
in a relational database (typically PostgreSQL).
YAWL separates resource management of work items from
the work item lifecycle that is relevant to the case progress.
For example, after the workflow engine creates (enables) a
work item, the resource service manages the work item in
the worklists of the resources it has been offered or allocated
to. Offering, allocation, de-allocation, re-offering, etc. is not
relevant to the workflow engine and consequently the engine
is not involved or notified. Hence, we do not consider these
operaitons as workflow operations. When a resource starts
work on a work item, the resource service notifies the engine
of this operation (”check-out”), as this operation is relevant to
the case progression, e.g. for a deferred choice pattern, because
it fires the associated workflow net transition. Hence, we
consider this a workflow operation. Any subsequent resource
changes such as delegation or re-assignment are managed
internally by the resource service without involvement of the
engine. These operations are not workflow operations. Only
when the work item is completed, is the engine notified
(”check-in”). This is another workflow operation.
Our adaptation of YAWL is guided by these principles:
1) Every organization collaborating in the inter-
organizational workflow provides its own block
service, ordering service, YAWL workflow engine and
associated YAWL services. Together, these form a
”node” (cf. Sec IV).
2) Each task in a workflow specification is assigned to a
single node.
3) Organizational resources and their unique identifiers are
local to each node.
4) Resource management of work items is performed lo-
cally for each organization/node and is only locally
relevant. This reflects the strict separation between
workflow-relevant work item changes and the resource-
relevant work item changes in YAWL.
Engine
D
B
Hibernate
Engine Gateway
Web Application Servlet API
Resource Service
Fig. 1. YAWL architecture (as-is)
Because the resource management is local to each node,
the YAWL resource service requires no adaptations. The fol-
lowing subsections desribe primarily the adaptations to YAWL
workflow engine.
A. Workflow Specifications
The only adaptation required for workflow specifications is
the addition of a node identifier for each task. We use the BFT-
SMART node identifier for this purpose, which is a simple
integer value that is mapped to IP addresses through the BFT-
SMART configuration. We updated the XML schema and the
schema processors, and extended the YAWL editor to allow
designers to specify this property for each atomic task.
B. Engine Adaptations
The YAWL workflow engine is a singleton Java class
(YEngine). Outside services do not interact with the engine
directly but through an encapsulating singleton class called the
engine gateway (YEngineGateway). This in turn is accessed
from a number of HTTP servlets that expose various interfaces
of the engine. Interface A is an administrative interface to
manage external services and their authentication mechanisms.
Interface B is the main interface for workflow aspects, such
as launching and cancelling cases, starting and completing
work items, etc. Interface E provides information for logging
purposes. Interface X allows exception handlers to interact
with the engine. Figure 1 shows this architecture where all
four interfaces are jointly represented by the ”Web Application
Servlet API”. The workflow engine announces changes to the
workflow state, such as new workitems or workitems skipped
or cancelled due to expired timers, to registered external
services through outgoing HTTP requests.
To adapt the YAWL engine to a blockchain infrastructure,
we intercept inbound calls to the engine gateway to order
them, distribute them to all nodes, and include them in the
blockchain. They are then passed back to the engine gateway
Read Write
Local Retrieve services Register new service
Global Retrieve case data for work item Launch case
TABLE I
WORKFLOW ENGINE ACCESS TYPES AND EXAMPLES
Workflow Specifications
loadSpecification
unloadSpecification
Workflow Cases
launchCase
cancelCase
Work Items
suspendWorkItem
unsuspendWorkItem
rollbackWorkItem
completeWorkItem
startWorkItem
skipWorkItem
createNewInstance
restartWorkItem
cancelWorkItem
rejectAnnouncedEnabledTask
TABLE II
INTERCEPTED AND ORDERED WRITE/UPDATE WORKFLOW OPERATIONS
and the workflow engine for execution. We use the BFT-
SMART library for ordering (cf. Sec. IV). We essentially split
the engine gateway into a client-side and a server-side part
and sandwich the ordering and block services in between. Our
adapted architecture is shown in Fig. 2. Also shown in the
figure are the steps to process a workflow request, explained
in detail below.
Calls to the engine gateway can be categorized on two
dimensions. First, some calls are read-only, while others
change the state of the engine. Second, some calls are local to
each engine while others are globally relevant. Table I shows
these categories and provides examples. Of all engine gateway
calls, only the globally relevant ones need to be intercepted;
the local ones are passed on directly to the local engine.
While the majority of workflow operations that need order-
ing and must be captured on the blockchains are concerned
with the work item lifecycle, some apply to workflow speci-
fications and cases. Table II provides a list of the intercepted
write/update workflow engine calls. Table III shows a list of
the intercepted read workflow engine calls.
Write Requests: We intercept the globally relevant write
or update calls for ordering, distribution, and inclusion in the
blockchain. They are submitted as requests to the ordering
service client, ordered, and handled by each ordering service
server. The ordering service server creates new blocks for
the block services, which in turn provides transactions in
new blocks to the engine gateway for execution by the
workflow engine. Any result from the workflow engine is
returned by each ordering service server, in addition to the
latest block hash, to the ordering layer. The ordering layer
returns the consensus result to the ordering service client or
signals request failure when no consensus is achieved.The path
of write/update workflow engine calls that require ordering
through the various components is as follows:
Workflow Specifications
getProcessDefinition
getSpecificationDataSchema
getStartingDataSnapshot
getSpecificationList
getSpecificationData
getLatestSpecVersion
Workflow Cases
getCasesForSpecification
getSpecificationIDForCase
getSpecificationForCase
getAllRunningCases
getCaseState
getCaseData
getCaseInstanceSummary
exportCaseState
exportAllCaseStates
Work Items
getAvailableWorkItemIDs
getWorkItem
describeAllWorkItems
getWorkItemsWithIdentifier
getWorkItemsForService
getTaskInformation
checkEligibilityToAddInstance
getChildrenOfWorkItem
getWorkItemOptions
getMITaskAttributes
getResourcingSpecs
getWorkItemInstanceSummary
getParameterInstanceSummary
TABLE III
INTERCEPTED AND ORDERED WRITE/UPDATE WORKFLOW OPERATIONS
Engine
D
B
Hibernate
Engine Gateway
Web Application Servlet API
Resource Service
Ordering Service Client
Ordering Service Server
Engine
D
B
Hibernate
Engine Gateway
Web Application Servlet API
Resource Service
Ordering Service Client
Ordering Service Server
Total Ordering Layer (BFT-SMART)
Block ServiceBlock Service
2
1
3
4
56
7
8
9
10
11
12
4
5
6
7
8
9
Fig. 2. YAWL on blockchain architecture and workflow event processing
1) Call received as HTTP POST method by servlet, sub-
mitted to engine gateway
2) Engine gateway identifies call that requires ordering,
submits call as request to ordering service client
3) Ordering service client submits request to ordering layer
4) Ordering layer passes ordering requests to all ordering
service servers
5) Every ordering service server passes request to local
block service for inclusion as a transaction in blockchain
6) Every block service passes the new transaction to local
engine for processing, using original engine API
7) Engine returns result to blockservice
8) Block service returns engine result with latest block hash
to ordering service server
9) Each ordering service server returns local result to
ordering layer
10) Ordering layer returns consensus result to ordering ser-
vice client or indicates lack of consensus.
11) Ordering service client returns result to engine gateway
12) Engine gateway returns result to HTTP servlet to be
returned as HTTP response
Read Requests: There are three options for handling
inbound read requests for globally relevant data. Read requests
do not need to be recorded on the blockchain. The first option
is to submit a read request straight to the local workflow
engine, bypassing the ordering layer (arrow ’2a’ in Fig. 2).
This is the fastest option but assumes a non-faulty local node.
The second option is to submit a read request to the ordering
layer as an unordered request, but for which a consensus result
is provided from all ordering service servers. The third option
is to submit a read request for ordering through the ordering
service and obtaining the consensus result. The third option
has the additional benefit of preventing inconsistent reads.
Consider a situation where a read request is submitted to the
ordering layer after a write request, but executed prior to the
write request. From the perspective of the requestor, the result
would be inconsistent. This inconsistency is avoided in the
third option. However, this option is also the slowest. The
second and third options provide the consensus workflow state
to the caller even if the local node is faulty. They are depicted
by arrows ’5a’ and ’8a’ in Fig. 2. For these options, the path
of read requests is the same as for write requests, except that
they bypass the block service as no new block is created. As
each option has advantages and disadvantages our system can
be configured to provide any of them.
C. Fault Detection and Recovery
When both write requests and read requests are intercepted
and ordered for consensus, the external services that access
a node receive consensus information even if the local block
service or workflow engine are faulty or unresponsive. This
is, after all, the goal of byzantine fault tolerance. In effect,
these services access a redundant, distributed, fualt-tolerant
workflow management system through the ordering service
client.
As shown in Fig. 2, the client-side engine gateway has direct
access to the local workflow server (arrow ’2a’). Hence, it
is possible for a node to identify when its local result for
a read request differs from the consensus result. For this,
our system can submit the same request along arrow ’2a’ as
well as ’2’ and compare the results. This cannot be done for
write requests so as not to doubly execute them. However,
many write operations in YAWL return the description of the
changed entity, such as the work item or the case identifier.
Our system can retrieve the local copy of the entity via arrow
’2a’ and compare that against the result of the write operation
issued along arrow ’2’.
Differences between local and consensus state may indicate
a faulty local block service or workflow engine. However,
in fast-moving processes, differences might also arise due to
timing. Because the consensus mechanism introduces a delay
(even though it is very brief, on the order of milliseconds),
the local state is read at a different time than the state for
the consensus finding (arrows ’2a’ and ’5a’ in Fig. 2). In that
case, differences do not indicate a local fault.
While external services accessing a node can continue to
function because they receive consensus information, differ-
ences between local and consensus information can indicate
when to reset and recover a node. Whether and when nodes
should be recovered depends the desired fault tolerance, to
what extent the local node owner is willing to accept faulty
information in the local blockchain or workflow engine, and
on whether the differences are due to real workflow evoluation
in fast-moving processes. Our system can be configured to
fail early. When differences between local and consensus
information are detected, the node is reset and recovered. Our
system can also be configured to keep operating; in this case
there is no comparison between local and consensus state but
the node operator can manually issue a command to reset and
recover. Node recovery deletes the local blockchain replica,
the local ordering service server state, all information in the
local workflow engine database, and then re-initializing the
node as if it was a new node entering the system (Sec. V-G).
D. Time
Because nodes do not generally have synchronized clocks,
time-dependent requests may be problematic. Even synchro-
nized clocks do not guarantee that requests are executed by
the workflow engines on different nodes at precisely the same
time. Due to network latencies, computational load and other
factors, requests reach the different nodes’ workflow engines
at slightly different times and are executed at different times.
In YAWL, time-dependency arises in three contexts. First,
work items contain enablement, firing , and start times set
by the local server on enablement, firing and start. Second,
YAWL provides timer tasks. Third, YAWL provides the option
of delayed (scheduled) case launches, where users specify a
point in time for the case launch or a duration for the delay.
As noted above, many workflow operations, such as start-
ing, skipping, cancelling or describing (retrieving) a work
item, return the work item serialized as XML. The timing
information in this serialization is necessarily local to each
workflow engine. Hence, when such requests are run through
the ordering service, no consensus can be established. Our
system addresses this issue by omitting time information from
the XML serialization for ordering consensus (arrows ’3’ to
’10’ in Fig. 2). After the ordering service returns a consensus
result, the local node compare its local work item information
with the consensus result (arrow ’2a’ in Fig. 2), and, if they
match, substitutates the complete information from the local
engine. This prevents loss of any information that may be
required by external services, such as the resource service. If
the local and consensus information do not match, depending
on system configuration, an error is signalled to trigger node
recovery or the consensus information is returned without the
timing information (cf. Sec. V-C).
Timer tasks in YAWL are managed through timers in
the workflow engine. When a work item timer expires, the
controlling YWorkItemTimer object skips the work item if it
has been started but not yet completed (timer begins at work
item start), or cancels the work item, if it has not been started
yet (timer begins at work item enablement). When a work
item is completed normally prior to timer expiry, the timer
is simply cancelled by the workflow engine. To allow this
mechanism to function, and the skipping or cancellation be
captured by the ordering service and blockchain, we changed
the YWorkItemTimer object to call the engine gateway, instead
of the engine, even though it is controlled by the engine.
YAWL manages delayed (scheduled) case launches sim-
ilarly to timer tasks. A YLaunchDelayer object is created
that calls the engine to launch the new case upon expiry.
Similar to our change to the work item timer, we adapted
the YLaunchDelayer to call the engine gateway, instead of the
engine.
E. Work Item Visibility
Enabled work items are announced to external services by
the engine through an announcer object, to which external
services register themselves as an observer. To limit work
item visibility to the node they are associated with, we
modified the announcer to check each announcement whether
it is relevant to the local node: Announcements referring to
cases are relevant to all nodes and are always announced;
announcements referring to work items are relevant to specific
nodes only and are announced only if they refer to the local
node. Table IV shows a list of announcements, categorized by
whether they are locally or globally relevant.
Additionally, write requests relevant to work items (Table II)
are only accepted if they refer to a work item that is assigned to
the local node. This ensures only the local services can act on
local work items and is necessary as a node’s external service
may have information also about non-local work items through
the read requests in Table III. This is checked by the engine
gateway before requests are submitted to the ordering service
(arrow ’2’ in Fig. 2). This is also checked before workflow
operations received from the block service are passed on to
the engine for execution (arrow ’6’ in Fig. 2). The latter check
Global
Case start
Case completion
Case cancellation
Case deadlock
Case suspension
Case resumption
Local
Work item firing
Work item status change
Work item cancellation
Timer expiry
TABLE IV
ANNOUNCED EVENTS, LOCAL EVENTS ARE ANNOUNCED ONLY IF THEY
CONCERN THE LOCAL NODE
uses the originating node identifier in every transaction and
is necessary because faulty or malicious nodes may submit a
workflow operation that is not assigned to their node. Correctly
operating nodes must identify and reject such an operation.
F. Blockchain Monitor Service
To allow for monitoring the ordering and block services, we
implemented an additional web service. Through this service,
it is possible to examine the blockchain with its blocks and
transactions, to see the current state of the ordering service, i.e.
the level of fault tolerance and the set of nodes that participate
in the current ordering view, and it is possible to manually
trigger reset and recovery of the node.
G. Node Startup
The YAWL workflow engine database has been extended to
store the hash of the last block that has been passed to it from
the block service after executing each workflow operation. The
last block hash is required during node startup, which proceeds
as follows. The servlet container starts the interface B servlet,
which in turn creates the singleton instance of the engine
gateway. The engine gateway creates the singleton instance
of the engine. During initialization, the engine reads the latest
block hash from its database. Next, the ordering service server
is started. The peer-to-peer network for block exchange is
then started and contacts other peers. The first contacted peer
initiates an ordering servie view change to join the new node
into the BFT-SMART ordering view. As part of the BFT-
SMART state exchange protocol, the new node receives the
consensus last block hash. Then, the local ordering service
client is started. The block service starts and, through the
ordering service client, requests the latest block hash from the
ordering service server. Comparing the local blockchain, the
last block hash of the engine and the consensus block hash, it
identifies and requests any missing blocks. Once all requested
blocks are received, the block service validates the blockchain.
The engine gateway then requests blocks from the engine’s
last block hash from the block service and replays these on
the engine until the engine is caught up with the consensus
blockchain. At this point the node is fully caught up with the
consensus blockchain and has completed its initialization.
VI. DISCUSSION
From the user’s perspective, the set of nodes that form the
distributed, fault-tolerant workflow system, look little different
from a singluar YAWL system. In proof-of-work systems,
users and workflow engines must be aware of and react to
possible transaction invalidation, blockchain reorganization,
eventual/delayed consensus and transactions pending their
required ”assumed safe” mining depth [21], [22]. In contrast,
because of immediate and final consensus in the BFT proto-
cols, our system behaves similar to non-blockchain systems,
with no pending transactions or latency for block mining. The
status of workflow operations cannot change and need not be
monitored or reported to the user. Response times to the user
are not noticeably longer than for a traditional YAWL system.
A. Correctness
Systems that deploy the workflow engine on the blockchain
as a smart contract enforce workflow consensus for every node
as the workflow state is represented by the smart contract
state. Submitting an illegal workflow operation, e.g. starting
an already checked-out work item, by a faulty or malicious
workflow engine will cause the smart contract to retain the
legal state and dismiss the submitted workflow operation. If
instead the faulty or malicious node attempts to submit a
transaction with an invalid smart contract state, the miners
will independently detect this during validation and ignore the
transaction. Invalid transactions will also be detected by each
node when blocks are received and validated.
In contrast, our approach guarantees that the majority of
nodes will arrive at a consensus about the current workflow
state (BFT approaches can tolerate up to 1/3 malicious
nodes). When a workflow engine submits an illegal workflow
operation, e.g. to start an already checked out work item, the
workflow engines of the non-faulty majority nodes will each,
individually and separately, reject this operation and return a
suitable error response. Hence, the consensus response signals
that the work item state has not changed. This indicates to the
requester that it is faulty. The requester can then be reset and
recovered. Note that illegal requests are still ordered and are
also stored in the blockchain. A limitation of our approach is
that faulty nodes can only detect their own failure once they
submit a transaction or request workflow information and the
consensus result differs from their local result. They cannot
detect their own faults while only receiving transactions in
new blocks because the ordering service servers do not receive
consensus results.
When a node needs to catch up with the blockchain, the
BFT-SMART state replication ensures that it receives the con-
sensus last hash as new state from the set of running ordering
nodes. With this, it is able to detect and reject incoming bad
blocks as they are transferred. In general, assuming that there
is a valid consensus on the ordering state (i.e. the last block
hash), a node can always verify its blockchain and, if required,
rebuild it by requesting blocks from other nodes.
They key difference between proof-of-work approaches and
ours is that blocks are not created on a single node, but on
every node separately and concurrently. That is, the challenge
is not to identify and reject bad (malicious) blocks as they
are transferred, but only to ensure consensus ordering. The
assumption of a majority of non-faulty nodes then ensures a
majority of nodes with the correct workflow state.
B. Limitations
Workflow Engine Recovery: Because the YAWL work-
flow engine was not designed for use on blockchain infrastruc-
ture, or any other kind of distributed infrastructure, it lacks a
number of useful features. It does not have a checkpointing
feature that would allow the engine to revert to a particular
state, e.g. states designated by particular block hashes. It also
lacks a rollback feature for workflow operations. Together
this means that, when a node encounters an illegal, or non-
concensus, state after submitting a workflow transaction, it can
neither undo a number of transactions nor can it revert to a
named checkpoint state. Instead, it must rebuild the worklow
engine state by means of re-playing all transactions in the
blockchain, which can be a very expensive operation.
Resource Assignments: There may be situations where
it is desirable to specify that a work item may be performed
by some resource role irrespective of the participating orga-
nization. However, as work items are assigned to a single
node in our system, it is not possible to offer work items for
execution to a set of resources across a set of collaborating
organizations. This limits the extent of collaboration in the
workflow. Similarly, delegetion or re-assignment of work items
are also not possible across organizational boundaries. At the
organizational level, this limitation can only be overcome by
a global organizational model, which requires participating
organizations to agree on role or skill definitions that are rel-
evant to resource management. This is a non-trivial challenge
especially in the absence of trust. At the technical level, this
requires moving not only the workflow engine but also the
resource service to a distributed model using the blockchain.
This too is a non-trivial challenge.
Resource Specifications: A YAWL workflow specifica-
tion contains resource identifiers for assigning each task’s
resourcing. One of the limitations of the YAWL specification
editor is that it connects to a single YAWL resource service
to access organizational data for use in workflow specifica-
tions. Because nodes maintain their own resource information,
constructing a global workflow specification must be done by
manually adding the necessary local resource identifiers to the
workflow specification.
Throughput and Scalability: While our approach has
lower latency and higher throughput than proof-of-work block-
chains, it does not scale to a very large number of nodes.
Given these characteristics, our architecture is suitable for
permissioned blockchain applications using a small group of
participants (on the order of a few tens). The low latency
and high throughput also make them suitable for fast-moving
processes, where activities are of short duration or must follow
each other quickly. For example, our transaction throughput
time is well below one second, whereas many proof-of-work
blockchains operate at latencies on the order of minutes.
Resilience: An often discussed attack on proof-of-work
based blockchains requires a malicious actor to control the
majority (> 50%) of the total hashing power of all nodes.
In contrast, attacking a BFT-based system requires control of
more than 1/3 of all nodes. Assuming equal hashing power for
all nodes, the proof-of-work based blockchain appears more
resilient to attacks. However, in many use cases, this assump-
tion is unlikely to hold. Small networks and networks where a
few actors control significant resources are particularly prone
to an imbalance in hashing power. In contrast, attacking a BFT-
based system cannot be done by concentrating computational
power but requires control of more than 1/3 of all nodes,
which is difficult to achieve in the absence of trust among
actors. As a result, resilience to attacks and faults cannot
be easily compared between proof-of-work and BFT-based
blockchains; it is context and application dependent.
Workflow, Trust, and Fault Tolerance Requirements: In
our approach, the number of nodes must strike a balance
between the requirements of the workflow, the level of fault
tolerance, and the performance of the system. The number of
ordering nodes is determined by the desired level of fault tol-
erance, whereas the number of workflow nodes is determined
based on the use case and the number of participating actors.
A use case requiring more ordering than workflow nodes (e.g.
because some actors share a workflow engine but do not wish
to relinquish control over the blockchain infrastructure) can be
accommodated by nodes that are not assigned any workflow
activities. On the other hand, when a use case requires more
workflow nodes than ordering nodes (e.g. because groups of
actors trust each other), the excess ordering nodes decrease
performance due to the BFT protocol communication over-
head. This drawback can only be addressed by relaxing the
trust requirements, i.e. groups of actors must partially trust
each other, so that the 1 : 1 correspondence between ordering
service, block service, and workflow engine can be relaxed.
C. Future Extensions
As our system works at the level of work items and their
lifecycle transitions, rather than the semantics of a workflow
specification language such as BPMN, an extension to hetero-
geneous workflow engines is readily possible. This requires a
mapping of work item lifecycles of the different workflow en-
gines, possibly with a canonical intermediate lifecycle model
to be used on the ordering service layers. When workflow
requests are intercepted, they are translated to the canonical
lifecycle interchange model, ordered, and back-translated to
particular engine lifecycle models and workflow operations
by each ordering service server prior to execution by the local
workflow engine. For our own future work, we are particularly
interested in other open-source workflow systems, such as the
Bonita system, due to their easy adaptability.
Previous work on blockchain-based WfMS has focused on
smart contracts and proof-of-work based blockchains. How-
ever, proof-of-work-based systems have significant drawbacks
in terms of processing power requirements, latency, and the
lack of final consensus. In this work, we have shown that
a BFT-derived ordering and consensus method is a suitable
WfMS infrastructure. Even without the use of smart contracts,
the use of a blockchain remains essential, as it provides
independent validation of workflow actions, distribution, repli-
cation, and tamper-proofing to workflow management systems.
While there are limitations to the BFT-based approach (cf.
Sec. VI-B), our approach also has significant advantages over
proof-of-work based approaches:
• Our system is cheaper to operate than public proof-of-
work blockchains that incentivize block mining through
cryptocurrencies. While proof-of-work based blockchains
may be deployed privately, they are then open to in-
creased risk of attack (cf. Sec. VI-B).
• Our system provides immediate and final consensus. This
means that from both the workflow modeller’s perspective
and the user’s perspective, the system looks and behaves
like a traditional workflow engine. Neither the workflow
designer nor the user need to deal with issues of trans-
action status or eventual transaction invalidation.
• Our system provides a greater throughput than proof-of-
work based approaches.
• Not relying on smart contracts enables porting of ex-
isting feature-complete workflow engines to blockchain
infrastructure. This allows rich workflow languages and
leverages existing implementations.
To conclude, this paper has presented a prototype im-
plementation for an architecture that has not yet seen any
attention in the blockchain-based workflow literature. We have
implemented a BFT-based system as recommended by [17]
and shown that this infrastructure is suitable as the infrastruc-
ture foundation for adapting existing workflow management
systems to support inter-organizational workflows.
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